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THE UNSUPPORTED DELEGATION OF CONFLICT
ADJUDICATION IN ERISA BENEFIT CLAIMS UNDER
THE GUISE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
DONALD T. BOGAN*
Cynics, and there are a few of us, worry that sometimes, some judges
employ principles of statutory construction as a means to justify a
predetermined end. As the devil quotes the Bible for his or her own purposes,
do judges advance political agendas on a case-by-case basis, supporting their
policy-motivated decisions by selective application of rules of statutory
interpretation? Do canons of construction direct a court's conclusions, or do
some judges apply either a textualist or a nontextualist brand of statutory
interpretation, depending upon which method of construction more
persuasively produces the judge's personally desired political result?'
© 2004 Donald T. Bogan
* Director of Clinical Education and Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma
College of Law. J.D. 1979, Wake Forest University School of Law; A.B., 1974, Brown
University. I am grateful to ERISA practitioner and Adjunct Professor of Law Mark DeBofsky
for sharing his insights on the misapplication of administrative law-based judicial deference in
ERISA claims litigation. See Mark D. DeBofsky, The Paradox of the Misuse ofAdministrative
Law in ERISA Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 727 (2004).
1. Consider the arguably inconsistent application of the textualist statutory interpretation
method in cases construing ERISA, which is found at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (amended 2004)
and in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code. In its early ERISA cases interpreting
the statute's preemption clause, which provides that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State
laws... [that] relate to any employee benefit plan," the U.S. Supreme Court applied a plain
meaning interpretation of the "relate to" phrase in the preemption language, which often resulted
in the preemption of state consumer protection laws. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
(2000); see, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (holding that state law
claim for bad faith breach of disability insurance contract relates to an ERISA plan and is not
saved from preemption as a law that regulates insurance). Then later, when ERISA's express
savings clause exception to preemption for "any law of any State which regulates insurance"
was asserted by consumers as a defense to ERISA's preemption of a state law that arguably
provided a state law remedy aimed at the insurance industry, the Supreme Court discarded its
plain meaning interpretive method and suggested that ERISA's implied preemption of state law
remedies was so strong that it trumped even the express language of the statute. ERISA
§514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000); see Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,
536 U.S. 355, 377-78 (2002) (in dicta, opining that a state insurance law would be impliedly
preempted by ERISA's civil enforcement provisions if the insurance law provided a remedy in
addition to those remedies set forth in ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132); see also Aetna Health
Inc. v. Davila, Nos. 02-1845, 03-83, 2004 WL 1373230 (U.S. June 21, 2004) (confirming
Moran's dicta in holding that implied preemption of state law remedies trumps ERISA's express
savings clause exception to preemption for state laws that regulate insurance).
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The Honorable Frank H. Easterbrook, in his entertaining Henry Lecture at
the University of Oklahoma College of Law, provides insight into some of the
processes of judicial law-making that both encourages the cynic with the
candid recognition of the cynic's concerns,2 and soothes the mind of the
moderate by explaining systematic judicial methods that justify court
decisions that defer, in appropriate circumstances, to the policy-driven rulings
of administrative bodies under the Chevron3 doctrine.
Judge Easterbrook identifies three separate subjects - delegation, respect,
and persuasion - that fall within the rubric of judicial "deference" to
administrative agencies, as commonly described by courts and scholars.4
Judge Easterbrook argues that each of these subjects of judicial deference
should be separately acknowledged, because "[c]onsiderations applicable to
one... may be off the mark for the other."5 Distinguishing "delegation" in
particular, Judge Easterbrook states that courts must accept administrative
agency action, within the sphere of its delegated authority, when Congress has
granted to the agency "the power to adopt legal norms via a formal rulemaking
or administrative adjudication."6
In addition to his recommendation that courts unpack the multiple meanings
of administrative discretion in statutory interpretation, Judge Easterbrook
remarks that courts quite appropriately allow political considerations to infuse
the interpretation of statutes when the policy choices are made by Article H
officers subject to public accountability, as opposed to tenured Article I
officers.7 Here Judge Easterbrook suggests that courts consider "the link
between the identity of the decider and the appropriate interpretive norms"
when applying deference.' I do not quarrel with Judge Easterbrook' s process
for deferential judicial review of interpretive discretion granted to Article H
officers. Rather, I borrow Judge Easterbrook's foundational structure and
2. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L.
REv. 1, 20 (2004) ("Now consider again: is choosing the method of interpretation inherently
political? That most of the decisions I have discussed are unanimous - or lopsided with no
apparent political spin to the voting - suggests not. It can be political if the interpreter is
intellectually dishonest, switching between 'plain meaning' and more expansive styles according
to the judge's estimate of the preferable outcome. It can be political if the interpreter uses
rhetoric of low generality to disguise other methods.... When we worry about tenured officers
exalting their will over that of the legislature - that is, all the time - we ought to prefer a
model of construction under which this is a sin rather than one under which it is the norm.").
3. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
4. See Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion, supra note 2, at 4-5.
5. Id. at 5.
6. Id. at 4.
7. See id. at 4-9.
8. Id. at 4.
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transfer those sound considerations of judicial deference to a distinct area of
the law, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)9 , to
see if some reason can be introduced into ERISA benefit claims litigation,
which currently suffers from an unsupportable judicial deference to the
decisions of nongovernmental, ERISA plan claims administrators.'0
L Congress Did Not Delegate Adjudicatory Powers to Any Agency in
ERISA
For Judge Easterbrook's purposes in examining judicial deference in
statutory interpretation, he found it acceptable to bundle "rulemaking" and
"administrative adjudication" into the same subcategory ofjudicial deference,
which he termed "delegation," even though he otherwise urged courts to
examine the various subjects of judicial deference separately." I suggest that
delegation of "rulemaking" powers and delegation of powers of
"administrative adjudication" should also be distinguished by courts and
viewed separately when courts seek to determine what, if any, deference is
due to an ERISA plan administrator's "adjudication" of a plan participant's
employee benefit claim.'2 The reason is simple; Congress delegated
rulemaking authority under ERISA to the Department of Labor (DoL), 3 but
9. Pub. L. No. 93-406,88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 and
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
10. See, e.g., De Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1188 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[W]ere we
to consider de novo review appropriate, we might well hold for the retirees. Indeed, the
appellants have offered an interpretation of the Plan which could be considered not only
'reasonable,' but 'more reasonable' than Vitro's."); Brown v. Ret. Comm. of Briggs & Stratton,
797 F.2d 521,529 (7th Cir. 1986) ("'When [discretionary] power has been conferred [by a plan
on the plan administrator], the judicial role is limited to determining whether the ...
[Committee's] interpretation was made rationally and in good faith - not whether it was
right."') (second alteration in original) (quoting Riley v. MEBA Pension Trust, 570 F.2d 406,
410 (2d Cir. 1977)).
11. See Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion, supra note 2, at 4-5.
12. I highlight the term "adjudication" here to emphasize that I do not consider a claims
adjuster's refusal to pay benefits an adjudication analogous to the decisions of an Administrative
Law Judge, which is how I perceive Judge Easterbrook uses the term.
13. See generally CONF. REP. No. 93-1280 (1974), reprinted in 3 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF
THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUB. WELFARE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
EMPLOYEE RET. INCOME SEC. ACT OF 1974, at 326-33 (1976) (Comm. Print) [hereinafter
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. ERISA's legislative history demonstrates that Congress weighed the
interests of both the Department of Labor and the Treasury Department when it was debating
this new comprehensive legislation and chose to delegate regulatory authority to both agencies
in the final legislation. See, e.g., Remarks of Sen. Benston Introducing S. 1179, 93d Cong.
(1973), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 211.
2004]
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it considered, and decided against, delegating adjudicatory powers to the DoL
or any other government agency.14
Instead of organizing an administrative hearings apparatus within the DoL
to adjudicate plan participant claims for benefits under ERISA-governed
employee benefit plans, Congress provided express jurisdiction in federal
court and an express remedy for workers to recover benefits due under their
employment-provided fringe benefit programs. 15 Given ERISA's express
grant of a federal court remedy to plan participants, it is a cruel curiosity that
federal judges commonly refuse workers the right to conduct discovery in
ERISA claims litigation 6 and refuse to conduct evidentiary hearings, where
witnesses can be examined and cross-examined, to entertain the merits of
14. The Senate Finance Committee recommended that administrative adjudicatory authority
be granted to the Department of Labor under ERISA. See S. 1179, 93d Cong. § 602 (1973),
reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 780,988-90; S. REP. No. 93-383, at 116-
17 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4999-5000. The delegation of adjudicatory
powers provisions of the Senate Finance Committee bill did not appear in the final Senate bill
submitted to Conference. Congress also dismissed a proposal to require arbitration of plan
participant benefit claims. See H.R. 2, 93d Cong. 566-67 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 13, at 3813-14; 120 CONG. REc. 29,941 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits),
reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 4769. An attempt to reinsert
administrative adjudicatory authority was also defeated. See 120 CONG. REc. 29,563 (1973),
reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 1245; 119 CONG. REc. 30,401 (1973),
reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 1838.
15. See ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000) (creating a federal
remedy for plan participants to recover benefits due under an ERISA-govemed employee benefit
plan); ERISA § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (creating federal courtjurisdiction). ERISA
also provides state courts with concurrent jurisdiction to hear plan participant claims for
benefits, see id., but because of the opportunity for federal question jurisdiction, most benefits
cases filed in state court are removed by defendants to federal court. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987). See generally Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The Savings
Clause, § 502 Implied Prememption, Complete Preemption, and State Law Remedies, 42 SANTA
CLARAL. REV. 105 (2001).
16. See, e.g., Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. Comprehensive Disability Prot. Plan, 195 F.3d
975, 981-82 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J.) ("Deferential review of an administrative decision
means review on the administrative record. We have allowed parties to take discovery and
present new evidence in ERISA cases subject to de novo judicial decisions, but never where the
question is whether a decision is supported by substantial evidence, or is arbitrary and
capricious.") (citations omitted); see also Vega v. Nat'l Life Ins. Serv., Inc., 188 F.3d 287, 300
(5th Cir. 1999) ("[The administrative record consists of relevant information made available
to the administrator prior to the complainant's filing of a lawsuit and in a manner that gives the
administrator a fair opportunity to consider it.... [W]e will not permit the district court or our
own panels to consider evidence introduced to resolve factual disputes with respect to the merits
of the claim when that evidence was not in the administrative record.").
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workers' benefits claims. 7 Courts justify this apparent contradiction to
Congress's express mandate by misapplying principles of deference.
Judge Easterbrook's warning that uniform applications of judicial
deference - without appreciation for the many nuanced circumstances where
the occasion for some issue of deference arises - can be "off the mark" is
dramatically presented in ERISA cases in which courts have confused
deference as applied under trust law with administrative law-based
adjudicatory deference. 18 Because ERISA requires that employers fund some
(but not all) employee benefit plans through the establishment of a trust, 9 the
Supreme Court has ruled that trust law principles govern ERISA claims for
benefits.2" Trust law, however, provides for a type of judicial deference
unrelated to administrative law deference.
Under trust law, where the settlor of a trust grants discretionary authority
to a nonconflicted trustee, courts defer to the trustee's discretionary acts,
unless the trustee abused its discretion.2 The application of trust law
17. See Leahy v. Raytheon Co., 315 F.3d 11, 17-18 (lstCir. 2002) ("In an ERISA benefit
denial case, trial is usually not an option: in a very real sense, the district court sits more as an
appellate tribunal than as a trial court. It does not take evidence, but, rather, evaluates the
reasonableness of an administrative determination in light of the record compiled before the
plan fiduciary."); Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963,966 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Nothing in the
legislative history suggests that Congress intended that federal district courts would function as
substitute plan administrators, a role they would inevitably assume if they received and
considered evidence not presented to administrators concerning an employee's entitlement to
benefits. Such a procedure would frustrate the goal of prompt resolution of claims by the
fiduciary under the ERISA scheme."); see also Crespo v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 294 F.
Supp. 2d 980, 992 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (merm) (urging a trial on the papers as the most efficient
process to resolve ERISA benefit disputes).
18. See Mark D. DeBofsky, The Paradox of the Misuse of Administrative Law in ERISA
Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALLL. REv. 727 (2004).
19. ERISA section 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (2000), requires that all assets of an employee
benefit plan shall be held in trust. However, ERISA's funding provisions exempt welfare
benefit plans from the statute's funding requirements. See ERISA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 1081.
Consequently, employee pension plans must be funded through a trust (or through the purchase
of insurance), but the trust-as-funding-device requirement only applies to nonpension fringe
benefit programs that choose to separately fund their plans. If an employer decides to pay
nonpension plan benefit programs out of its operating capital, the employer does not need to
establish a trust to fund the plan. See Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: Retaining Firestone in Light
of Great-West - Implications for Standard of Review and the Right to a Jury Trial in Welfare
Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSH.L L. REv. 629, 670-72 (2004).
20. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-11 (1989).
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 187 (1959) ("Where discretion is conferred
upon the trustee with respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by
the court, except to prevent an abuse by the trustee of his discretion."); see also Bruch, 489 U.S.
at 111.
2004]
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deference in ERISA claims might be supportable if it were applied only to
those ERISA plans funded through a trust (which it is not 22) and only to the
discretionary acts of nonconflicted trustees (which it is not23). But even with
those caveats, court deference to ERISA plan administrators' benefit claim
denials is all wrong because courts have applied an administrative law-based
adjudicatory deference, rather than a trust law-based deference in ERISA
benefit claims.
Trust law-based deference is vastly different than the administrative law-
based adjudicatory deference referenced by Judge Easterbrook. Trust law
deference deals with evidentiary burdens, but it does not assume to replace (or
discard) the adjudicatory process. When a trust beneficiary challenges a
trustee's discretionary acts, courts apply a deferential abuse of discretion
standard of review, but the beneficiary is still entitled to conduct discovery on
the issue of the trustee's abuse of discretion, and a court, applying state law,
conducts the trust law trial as it would any other nonjury trial - by hearing
testimony, admitting evidence, and rendering a decision.24
In administrative law-based adjudicatory deference, an administrative
agency (presumably neutral) makes an initial determination of contested
matters, and courts then review the administrative action, hopefully according
to Judge Easterbrook's unbundled and separate levels of deference. For
example, the process in Social Security Administration disability claims
involves a federal government employee, the neutral Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ), conducting an administrative trial where the disability claimant
offers evidence and typically has the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses
22. See, e.g., Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140, 1148 (4th Cir. 1985), aff'd
sub. nom. Brooks v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 477 U.S. 901 (1986); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d
708,711 (9th Cir. 1985); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1988) (No. 87-1054) (arguing that it is
inapposite to apply trust law principles in ERISA benefit claims when plan at issue is not funded
through a trust).
23. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 378 (3d Cir. 2000) ("This
appeal concerns the standard courts should use when reviewing a denial of a request for benefits
under an ERISA plan by an insurance company which, pursuant to a contract with an employing
company, both determines eligibility for benefits, and pays those benefits out of its own funds.
This question, and variations thereof, have bedeviled the federal courts since considered dicta
in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch gave opaque direction about how courts should review
discretionary benefits denials by potentially conflicted ERISA fiduciaries.") (citation omitted);
Van Boxel v. J. Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir. 1987) (suggesting a
sliding scale application of deference to the decisions of conflicted ERISA plan administrators).
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959).
24. See generally GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 870 (rev. 2d ed. 1977).
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who might appear in opposition to his or her claim. 25 Article I judges then
review Social Security Administration adjudicatory rulings with deference to
the ALJ's actions because Congress delegated the adjudicatory function in
such cases to the agency.26 Additionally, deference is justified in cases where
a district court is reviewing a Social Security Administration benefit claim
determination because the claimant had the opportunity to be heard before a
neutral officer in an administrative trial prior to the appeal to the federal
district court.
In ERISA cases, while reciting trust law-based deference (which, again,
would still allow for discovery and a trial to prove the trustee's abuse of
discretion), federal courts actually apply administrative law-based
adjudicatory deference at the trial court level (foreswearing an evidentiary
hearing), even though there has been no administrative trial below. In ERISA
benefits cases, courts incongruously equate the ERISA plan administrator's
claim investigation and claim denial with an administrative law trial, and
wrongly equate the plan administrator's or plan insurer's claims file with the
"administrative record" one would expect to see in a social security disability
21action.
25. See also Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327, 332 (7th Cir. 2000). See
generally Taylor v. Callahan, 969 F. Supp. 664 (D. Kan. 1997).
26. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 405 (West Supp. 2004) (amended 2004). See generally Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
27. See Herzberger, 205 F.3d at 332 ("What may have misled courts in some cases is the
analogy between judicial review of an ERISA plan administrator's decision to deny disability
benefits and judicial review of the denial of such benefits by the Social Security
Administration.... Judicial review of the latter sort of denial is of course deferential, and it is
natural to suppose that it should be deferential in the former case as well. But the analogy is
imperfect .... quite apart from the fact that the social security statute specifies deferential
('substantial evidence') review. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Social Security Administration is a
public agency that denies benefits only after giving the applicant an opportunity for a full
adjudicative hearing before a judicial officer, the administrative law judge. The procedural
safeguards thus accorded, designed to assure a full and fair hearing, are missing from
determinations by [ERISA] plan administrators."); see also Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp.
Comprehensive Disability Prot. Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 978-80 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J.)
(equating ERISA with Social Security claims for analysis of remand question); Brown v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1564 n.7 (11th Cir. 1990) ("We express
caution, however, at wholesale importation of administrative agency concepts into the review
of ERISA fiduciary decisions. Use of the administrative agency analogy may, ironically, give
too much deference to ERISA fiduciaries. Decisions in the ERISA context involve the
interpretation of contractual entitlements; they 'are not discretionary in the sense, familiar from
administrative law, of decisions that make policy under a broad grant of delegated powers.'
Moreover, the individuals who occupy the position of ERISA fiduciaries are less well-insulated
from outside pressures than are decisionmakers at government agencies.") (quoting Van Boxel,
836 F.2d at 1050) (citation omitted). Contra Perlman, 195 F.3d at 985-86 (Wood, J.,
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Judges who have failed to distinguish between trust law-based judicial
deference and administrative law adjudicatory deference in ERISA cases have
instigated the absurd result that workers who receive fringe benefit packages
through their employment - for example health care benefits or disability
benefits - are deprived of their right to discovery in benefit claim litigation,
denied the right to cross-examine witnesses, and denied the right to an
evidentiary hearing before a neutral arbiter when a plan administrator or plan
insurer denies the worker's request for benefits.28 Yet Congress did not
delegate adjudicatory powers to any agency in ERISA. By viewing the
underlying insurance claims process as if it were akin to an administrative
trial, courts have denied ERISA plan participants their day in court. Congress
granted plan participants the right to sue and seek justice in federal court.
Federal district judges are not doing their jobs when they limit claimants to
argument on an unsworn paper record as their only court hearing, based upon
an unthoughtful assertion of deference.
IL No Rule of Statutory Construction Justifies Judicial Deference to
Adjudicatory Decisions of ERISA Plan Administrators Who Are Neither
Trustees nor Administrative Law Judges
Perhaps ERISA's titles and nomenclature have tricked judges. Despite the
statute's use of the term "administrator" to describe the person or entity in
charge of running private pension and welfare benefit plans, ERISA plan
administrators are not employees of any agency of the government.29
Particularly in welfare plans, which are often unfunded,3" neither is a plan
administrator a neutral "trustee" entitled to trust law deference - you cannot
have a trustee without a trust res.
When courts defer to an ERISA plan administrator's discretionary
decisions, courts are merely crediting one litigant's view of the dispute over
dissenting) (debunking the analogy to Social Security Administration claims).
28. See Meditrust Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Sterling Chems., Inc., 168 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1999).
29. See Brown, 898 F.2d at 1564 n.7. Courts also may have confused ERISA's requirement
that plans establish an internal appeals process with the delegation of adjudicative powers. See
ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2000). By requiring plans to fairly review claims, ERISA
merely imposes a good faith duty on the plan administrator, similar to a state insurance
regulation that governs an insurance company's claims process. See, e.g., 36 OKLA. STAT. §
1250.5 (2001) (acts constituting unfair claims settlement practices). It is not comparable to a
delegation of adjudicatory authority, which would look something like the processes that govern
Social Security Administration disability claims.
30. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 105 (1989) (unfunded
severance benefit plan); Mass. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 136 (1985) (unfunded
disability benefit plan).
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that of the other litigant, without providing due process of law to the
unfavored party. What results is a judicially created animal known asa "trial
on the papers,"31 where the insurance claims file is submitted to the court as
the "administrative record,"32 and the judge enters a decision that the plan
administrator/claims adjuster did, or did not, abuse its discretion in denying
the workers claim for benefits without the claimant ever having the
opportunity to cross-examine a witness.
Without appreciating the "link between the identity of the decider and the
appropriate interpretative norms,, 33 courts that defer to ERISA plan
administrators have left the fox in charge of the hen house. ERISA plan
administrators are the appointed representatives of employers who sponsor
fringe benefit programs for their employees.34 In fact, plan insurers who are
obligated to pay earned ERISA benefit claims often serve as the plan
administrator.35 Where the decider is neither an agency, nor an ALJ, nor a
trustee, nor neutral, there is no reason in law for courts to delegate their
adjudicatory powers to a private party litigant.
Il. Conclusion
The ERISA plan claims administrator is not a judge, and the process of
pretrial attempts to settle claims without litigation do not create an
administrative record. Courts have failed to recognize that Congress delegated
rulemaking, but not adjudicatory powers, to the Department of Labor in
31. See Crespo v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 294 F. Supp. 2d 980, 991 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
("[T]he Court... strongly suggest[s] that... parties consider proceeding by means of a trial
on the papers under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) [in lieu of cross-motions for summary
judgment]").
32. See Perlman, 195 F.3d at 981-82 (Easterbrook, J.) (deferential review means review on
the administrative record as presented to the claims administrator); LaBarge v. Life Ins. Co. of
N. Am., No. 00-C-0512, 2001 WL 109527, at * 1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2001) (court enters findings
of fact and conclusions of law based upon administrative record).
33. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion, supra note 2, at 4.
34. See ERISA § 3(16)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (16)(A)(i) (2000) (plan administrator is the
person so designated by the terms of the plan operating document); ERISA § 3(16)(A)(ii), 29
U.S.C. § 1002 (16)(A)(ii) (plan sponsor serves as the default plan administrator if the plan
document fails to designate administrator); ERISA § 3(16)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (16)(B)
(employer or union identified as plan sponsor); ERISA § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 1102(21)(A)
(fiduciaries can serve in several capacities).
35. See, e.g., Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 378 (3d Cir. 2000).
Further, even where the plan insurer is not the named plan administrator, the insurer often has
preliminary authority to process claims, and as a practical matter, the plan insurer often controls
claims decisions, despite contrary language in plan documents saying that the plan administrator
retains final discretion and authority to make benefit claims determinations. See Computer
Aided Design Sys. Inc. v. SAFECO Life Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (S.D. Iowa 2002).
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ERISA. Additionally, ERISA courts have failed to "link the identity of the
decider" in ERISA claims - the non-neutral private representative of the
employer provider of benefits, or the plan insurer - with the "appropriate
interpretative norms" for applying judicial deference. Where the identity of
the decider in ERISA claims is not an Administrative Law Judge or some
other government agency or neutral adjudicatory body, no deference is due.
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